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Thomas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 14, 2017)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL & CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY  
 
Summary 
 
 When a defendant requests and is granted a mistrial, jeopardy will attach if a prosecutor’s 
conduct is so egregious that it results in prejudice to the defendant that cannot be remedied by 
anything short of a mistrial.2 
 
Background 
 
 Lacy L. Thomas, the former chief executive officer at University Medical Center (UMC), 
was tried for five counts of theft and five counts of official misconduct related to contracts UMC 
entered with five separate entities who were Thomas’s acquaintances. The State found these 
contracts so grossly unfavorable to UMC, that they constituted theft. One of these contracts 
involved Superior Consulting (ACS). 
 On approximately the fifth day of trial, an attorney for ACS informed Thomas’ attorneys 
of a disc containing documents that exonerated ACS. ACS’s attorney advised that the documents 
had been provided to the detectives who were investigating both ACS and Thomas. However, the 
documents were never provided to Thomas. Accordingly, Thomas moved for a mistrial. The 
district court found that the documents provided substantial material relevant to the cross-
examination of thirteen key witnesses who had already testified and granted a mistrial.  
Thomas then filed a motion to dismiss the case under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The 
district court granted the motion. On appeal, the Court upheld the dismissal of the theft charges 
related to ACS, but found that the indictment provided Thomas with sufficient notice of the 
remaining counts of theft and official misconduct.3 On remand, Thomas renewed his motion to 
dismiss based on double jeopardy. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court made a 
conclusive finding that: (1) the documents at issue were exculpatory and (2) the documents had 
been provided to the district attorney’s office. Nonetheless, the district court denied Thomas’s 
double jeopardy motion because it found that the State had not intentionally withheld the 
documents. The district court added that the documents withheld related to ACS’s conduct, and 
because the theft charge was dismissed with respect to ACS, double jeopardy did not “carryover” 
to the remaining counts. 
Thomas petitioned the Court for extraordinary relief, asking the Court to consider whether 
double jeopardy bars reprosecution and had attached to all charged counts. He also asked the Court 
to consider whether the district court had authority to rule on his renewed motion to dismiss for 
unconstitutional vagueness since he alleged that the district court had not reached these claims. 
 
Discussion: 
 
                                                
1  By Sara Schreiber. 
2  NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
3  State v. Thomas, Docket No. 58833 (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and 
Remanding, Sept. 26, 2013). 
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We exercise our discretion to consider Thomas’s petition 
 
 The Court has the sole discretion to decide whether to consider a writ of mandamus.4 
Judicial economy supports a review of the double jeopardy issues raised, before a second jury trial. 
Therefore, the Court exercised discretion to intervene by way of extraordinary writ. 
 
Double jeopardy applies in this case 
 
 Generally, a state may not charge a defendant twice for the same offense.5 To protect 
defendants from potential abuse by the State, courts have distinguished between cases where the 
prosecution requested a mistrial and those where the defense requested a mistrial.6 
 
Double jeopardy following the State’s request for mistrial 
 
 In cases where a prosecutor requests a mistrial, there is a strong concern that the State may 
seek a mistrial for its own advantage. Under these circumstances, a court must examine: (1) 
whether the mistrial was imposed by “manifest necessity,” and (2) “in the presence of manifest 
necessity, whether the prosecutor is responsible for the circumstances which necessitated 
declaration of a mistrial.”7 
 
Double jeopardy following a defendant’s request for mistrial 
 
 When a defendant moves for, or consents to, a mistrial generally any bar to reprosecution, 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, is removed.8 However, there is a narrow exception that enables 
the defendant to raise double jeopardy as a defense to subsequent reprosecution. This exception 
applies when the prosecutor intentionally provokes or “goads” the defendant into moving for a 
mistrial.9 The Court had previously adopted the Kennedy standard in Melchor-Gloria v. State, 
which bars reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause if a defendant demonstrates intent by 
the State to provoke a mistrial.10 
 
Criticism of the Kennedy standard 
 
 The inherent difficulties found in the Kennedy standard are thoroughly discussed in Pool 
v. Superior Court.11 The Arizona Supreme Court noted that, under Kennedy, proving specific intent 
to provoke mistrial, “must necessarily involve a subjective inquiry and is too difficult to 
                                                
4  Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 818 P.2d 849, 851 (Nev. 1991). 
5  U.S. CONST. amend. V; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
6  Taylor v. State, 858 P.2d 843, 851 (Nev. 1993) (Shearing, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
7  Hylton v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 743 P.2d 622, 625 (Nev. 1987). 
8  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982). 
9  Id. at 673-74. 
10  Melchor-Gloria v. State, 660 P.2d 109, 112 (Nev. 1983). 
11  Pool v. Super. Ct., 677 P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984). 
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determine.”12 The court held that in addition to those instances where a prosecutor intentionally 
attempts to “goad” a defendant into moving for a mistrial, jeopardy would attach where double 
jeopardy protections “would be impaired by a prosecutor’s intentional, improper conduct.”13 
 
New standard for double jeopardy following a defendant’s successful motion for mistrial 
 
 The Court reviewed Pool and other state court decisions that discussed the Kennedy 
standard and found that it was unduly narrow. The Court adopted the Pool standard which states 
that when a defendant requests and is granted a mistrial, jeopardy will attach if the prosecutor’s 
conduct is so egregious that it results in prejudice to the defendant which cannot be cured by any 
means short of a mistrial. Accordingly, courts should consider the following factors when 
evaluating a double jeopardy claim following a defendant's motion for a mistrial: 
1. mistrial is granted because of improper conduct or actions 
by the prosecutor; and 
2. such conduct is not merely the result of legal error, 
negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a 
whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows 
to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any 
improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger 
of mistrial . . . ; and 
3. the conduct causes prejudice to the defendant which 
cannot be cured by means short of a mistria1.14 
Concerning the second prong of this test, the Court noted that the question of whether a 
prosecutor “knows” or “intends” his conduct to be improper and prejudicial should be measured 
by objective factors such as: 
the situation in which the prosecutor found himself, the evidence of 
actual knowledge and intent and any other factors which may give 
rise to an appropriate inference or conclusion. [A trial court] may 
also consider the prosecutor's own explanations of his “knowledge” 
and “intent” to the extent that such explanation can be given 
credence in light of the minimum requirements expected of all 
lawyers.15 
The Court reiterated that the misconduct at issue must amount to more than “insignificant 
impropriety.” 
Concerning the third prong of this test, the Court noted that the district court has many 
ways in which to remedy prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, double jeopardy will attach only when 
misconduct by the prosecutor is egregious and intentional, which necessitates the grant of a 
mistria1. 
 
Under the facts of this case, double jeopardy bars reprosecution 
 
                                                
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. at 271-72. 
15  Pool, 677 P.2d at 271. 
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 At the evidentiary hearing regarding the double jeopardy motion, ACS’s counsel testified 
that he had provided police officers investigating the case with a disc of documents that he believed 
demonstrated that ACS had met its contractual obligations. Detective Robert Whitely remembered 
receiving the disc, and stated that, based on this evidence, he and Sergeant Michael Ford had 
recommended that the district attorney not charge ACS. Prior to the grand jury proceedings, 
Sergeant Ford remembered speaking with Deputy District Attorney Scott Mitchell on at least one 
occasion where this evidence had been brought up. After reviewing this testimony, the district 
court concluded that the prosecution did not intentionally act to withhold the evidence. 
The Court disagreed and concluded that this finding was clearly erroneous. The Court 
found that police officers’ testimony, coupled with the State’s failure to present any evidentiary 
testimony in defense against Thomas’s motion, was sufficient to determine that double jeopardy 
bars reprosecution. 
Under the Court’s newly-adopted three-part test, the record reflected that the mistrial was 
granted due to Mitchell’s improper conduct. The district court properly concluded that a mistrial 
was the only remedy that would cure the prejudice to Thomas. This conclusion was based on the 
facts that: (1) the mistrial motion was not fully litigated until the tenth day of trial; (2) the 
exculpatory nature and volume of documents disclosed; and (3) the number of witnesses that had 
already testified. The Court found that the intentional withholding of these documents was not a 
minor error. Rather, the misconduct satisfied the standard set forth in Pool, and therefore double 
jeopardy barred his reprosecution. 
 
Double jeopardy bars reprosecution on all charged counts 
 
 When the jury is sworn, double jeopardy attaches.16 As established by the United States 
Supreme Court, the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause arise from the fact that: (1) multiple 
prosecutions seriously disrupt a defendant’s personal life; (2) it can create the potential for 
governmental harassment of the defendant; and (3) it enhances the likelihood that an innocent 
defendant may be convicted.17 The interests protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause strongly 
suggest that when a case ends in mistrial, double jeopardy will bar reprosecution either on all 
counts or no counts. Because the Court concluded that double jeopardy attached to all counts when 
the jury was sworn, it bars reprosecution of Thomas on all counts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Evidence suggests that the prosecutor intentionally and improperly withheld exculpatory 
documents from Thomas. The prosecutor’s conduct was not an insignificant error. Rather, his 
conduct was egregious and improper, causing prejudice to Thomas that could only be cured by 
declaring a mistrial. Therefore, under the standard set forth in Pool, double jeopardy bars 
reprosecution of Thomas. Since double jeopardy attached to all counts when the jury was sworn, 
reprosecution of Thomas is barred on all counts. 
 
GIBBONS, J., concurring:  
 
                                                
16  Hanley v. State, 434 P.2d 440, 442 (Nev. 1967). 
17  See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978). 
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Justice Gibbons concurred only with the majority’s result.  
 
PICKERING, J., dissenting: 
 
Justice Pickering disagreed with the majority’s determination that the district court’s 
findings were “clearly erroneous” in regards to whether the State intentionally suppressed the 
exculpatory documents. Justice Pickering disagreed with the majority’s assertion that its decision 
did not overrule Melchor-Gloria. If the court had applied the standard set in Pool, to Melchor-
Gloria, a different analysis would have been required resulting in the defendant going free. This 
suggests that the new standard in Pool/Thomas overrules the goaded-mistrial test that Melchor-
Gloria adopted from Kennedy. Justice Pickering concluded that the majority should have 
remanded the case so that the parties could litigate and the district court could decide whether a 
retrial would violate double jeopardy. 
